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LORIS
[1] Negligence--Care Toward Invitees-Knowledge of Danger.-

mere fnc:t that
business visitor has
some time been
his vehicle on property owned by defendant does
not constitute sub:,tantial evidence in and of itself to put
defendant-owner on notice that other business visitors are
thereby threatened with
is not
sutllcient to
owner \vhere an
arises out of a
isolated,
act by the
ness visitor
vehicle.
[2] !d.-Care by Occupant of Real Property.-A
of land
who holds it out to the public for entry for
business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while
are on the land for such
for bodily harm
caused to them by the
or intentionally
harmful acts of third persons or animals if the possessor by
the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered that
such nets were being done or were about to be done and protected the members of the public by controlling the conduct
of third persons or
a warning adequate to enable them
to avoid harm without relinquishing any of the services they
are !'ntitled to receive from him.
[3] !d.-Anticipating Negligence.-In the absence of conduct to
put
person on notice to the
he is entitled to assume that others Viill not act
or unlawfully.
[ 4] Id.-Evidence.--ln an action for injuries sustained
an invitee at defendant's self-service station when another invitee
an air hose to blow out the
pipeline on his
a stream of gasoline to strike the first
in her
burning her and materially impairing her
defendant was not liable where there was no evidence
truck owner hnd been acting negligently or any evidence that could possibly put defendant on notice that he
might act negligently.

Sec Cal.Jur.2d,
See Cal.Jur.2d,

§ 113; Am.Jur., Negligence,§ 97.
§ 95; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 92

et seq.

See Cal.Jur.2d,

§ 43; Am.Jur.,

McK. Dig. References: [l] Neg ligenee, § 74;
§57;[3]
§27;[4]
§ 141.
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MoHAWK PETROLEUM CoRP.

[:51 C.2d

Court of the
APPEAI, from a judgment of thr
and
of San Franeis(·o. A. K. Wyl
Hrwrse(l.
A~tion against operator of gasoline servi~e station for injuries to an invitee eaused by the negligent aet of another
invitee. Judgment for plaintiff reversed.

Bledsor, Smith, Catlwart, Johnson & Phelps, R S. Catheart and Wilbur ,J. Huss for Appellant.
I_jeon A. Blum and Harold h Levin for Hesponc.1ent.
McCOMB, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment in favor
of plaintiff after trial before a jury in an aetion to reeover
damages for personal injuries received while plaintiff was a
business visitor on defendant's property.
Facts: Defrnclant owned a self-servire gasoline station in
San Prancisco, on a lot approximately 100 feet square. Gasoline was di:,;pensed from pumps located in the center of the lot.
Air and water facilities were located along a side of the lot for
use by customers desiring to service their own vehieles. On
the same edge of the lot and near the air and water outlets,
a large blackboard was maintained by defendant for posting
·winning numbers in drawings of tickets previously given
purchasers of defendant's gasoline.
On July 7, 1D53, Mr. Paris, a customer, bought some gasoline
for his pick-up truck. Being unable to start the motor, he
pushed his truek over to the area where the air and water fixtures were situated. He worked on the battery and motor for
six or seven hours.
The station attendant paid no attention to lVIr. Paris' activities, and did not offer to assist him or render any aid. Mr.
Paris finally decided that the pipeline leading to the gasoline
tank on his truek might be plugged. He then procee<1ed to
blow it out with the air hose provided to inflate tires. Instead
of the usual metal eap on the intake hole of thr gasoline tank,
there was simply a rag stuffed into the vent. lVIr. Paris did
not remove this rag, bnt diseonneeted the main gasoline line
from underneath the car and attached the air hose to it to
blow out the line.
In the nwantime, plaintiff and her husband drove into
the station. "While her husband was purchasing gasoline,
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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plaintiff got out of the car and went to the blackboard to see
whether she held any winning tickets in the drawing. She
was standing immediately at the rear of Mr. Paris' truck
when suddenly a stream of gasoline from the truck's tank
hit her in the face, causing serious burns on her face, chest,
arms and neck. Her eyesight was materially impaired.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum
of $5,000.
[1] 'l'his is the sole question necessary for us to determine:
Does the mere fact that a business visitor has for some i'ime
been working on his vehicle on property owned by defendant
constittde substantial evidence in and of itself to put the
defendant-owner on notice that other bttsiness visitors are
thereby threatened with danger, amd is such "possibility"
sttfficient to impose liability on the owner where an injury
arises out of a rnornentary, isolated, negligent act by the business visitor wm·king on his vehicle?
No. [2] The rule is correctly stated thus in Restatement,
Torts, section 348 :
''A . . . possessor of land who holds it out to the public
for entry for his business purposes, is subject to liability to
members of the public while upon the land for such purpose
for bodily harm caused to them by the accidental, negligent
or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals if
the poNsessor by the exercise of reasonable care could have
(a) discovered that such acts were being done or were
about to be done, and
(b) protected the members of the public by
(i) controlling the conduct of the third persons, or
(ii) giving a warning adequate to enable them to avoid
the harm without relinquishing any of the services which
they are entitled to receive from [him]."
This rule presupposes that the owner of the land by reasonable care could have discovered that the act which caused the
harm was being done or was about to be done.
[3] In Porter v. Cal'ifornia Jockey Club, Inc., 134 Cal.
App.2d 158, lGO I2J [28:) P.2d GO], the rule is stated thus:
"It is axiomatic that in the absence o£ eonduct to put him on
notice to the eontrary a person is enti tied to assume that
others will not aet negligently or unlawfully. (Citation.) ''
(See also lllawhiney v. Signal Tmcking Co., 1:32 Cal.App.2d
809, 81:{ [8] !283 P.2d 27] .)
[4] Applying the foregoing rnle to the facts of the present
case, there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Paris had

there was an

J., and
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the operator
Plaintiff left her automobile
maintained by defendant to notify
of tiekets previously disnear the air
hy a stream
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def'endant and had been
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that defendant did not exercise reason-

actual
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by the
provided
plaintiff and
and

that Paris was
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444

C.2d

amateurs,
and other
reasonable possibility that such persons working on
an instrumentality such as an automobile might create a dangerous situation. Yet appellant made no ef'Eort at all to
discover what Paris was doing or how he might be doing it.
He invited other customers to come to the area by maintaining
the blackboard in the immediate vicinity of the area where
Paris was working. No warning signs were posted to warn
invitees of the possible danger. Appellant knew, or should
have known, that Paris was working on his car for many
hours. Appellant knew that the trouble was not battery trouble because appellant's employee had sold Paris a new battery
and the employee knew that this did not start Paris' car.
Certainly the attendant knew, or should have known, that
Paris might be engaged in any one of several activities that
could create a danger to those nearby. He knew, or should
have known, that among these possibilities was that if the
person working on his car believed the gasoline line was
stopped up lJC might use the air pressure to blow it out. He
knew, or should have known, that the gasoline tank was
capped with a rag stuffed in the vent. Paris was working on
his car w·here the air hose was located. The possibility that
the air hose might be used for this purpose was not so unlikely that it was unforeseeable as a matter of law.'' ( Httnter
v. Mohawk Petroleum Corp. (CaLApp.), 332 P.2d 551.)
Prom this evidence the District Court of Appeal concluded
that the jury could infer that defendant had notice of the
possible danger to customers in the area of the blackboard.
I wholeheartedly agree with this conclusion and can see no
escape from the fact that the inferences to be drawn from this
evidenee ·were within the provinee of the jury. Therefore, the
jury verdict cannot be disturbed by this court unless it again
usurps the function of the jury and takes another excursion
into the fact finding field.
:F'or the foregoing reasons I would affirm the judgment.

